

MARCH 20, 1991

APRIL GLASPIE'S HILL APPEARANCE

(1) Vlag
(2) Legislative
(3) NEA

Q: Why appearing?

-- OUR POLICY IS THAT AMBASSADORS DO NOT NORMALLY APPEAR TO TESTIFY ON THE HILL.

15

-- GIVEN THE INTEREST, WE HAVE MADE AN EXCEPTION FOR AMB. GLASPIE'S APPEARANCES.

-- WE OFFERED HER TESTIMONY ONCE ON EACH SIDE: TODAY BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND TOMORROW BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE.

Q: Why not before?

-- THE SECRETARY HAS BEEN OUR PUBLIC SPOKESMAN THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS. SINCE SEPTEMBER 19, THE SECRETARY ALONE HAS CONFERRED WITH THE HILL ON POLICY QUESTIONS.

-- HE HAS APPEARED TEN TIMES BEFORE THE SENATE; TEN TIMES BEFORE THE HOUSE, AND ATTENDED FIVE WHITE HOUSE BRIEFINGS.

Media?

-- SHE HAS YOUR REQUESTS.

-- AS MARGARET MADE CLEAR, SHE IS FREE TO DO WHAT SHE WANTS.

-- WE WILL NOT FORCE ANYONE TO DO APPEARANCES. IT IS FOR HER TO DECIDE.

Timing?

-- WE OFFERED HER TESTIMONY TO BOTH HOUSES.

-- THE HOUSE CAME BACK FIRST AND SCHEDULED TESTIMONY FOR THURSDAY.

-- THE SENATE ASKED FOR WEDNESDAY. WE AGREED.

-- THEY PROPOSED A TIME -- TO WHICH WE AGREED -- BUT THEN ASKED TO CHANGE THE TIME IN ORDER TO GET THE FULL COMMITTEE TOGETHER. WE AGREED TO THE NEW TIME.

Instruction?

-- SHE IS FAMILIAR WITH CURRENT POLICY.

-- WE HAVE GIVEN HER NO SPECIAL DIRECTIONS ON WHAT TO SAY.

-- SHE KNOWS THE ISSUES WELL.

SEPT. 13, 1990

16

TRANSCRIPT OF SADDAM/GLASPIE MEETING

- OUR POSITION ON IRAQ'S THREATS AND INTIMIDATION OF ITS NEIGHBORS WAS CLEAR IN THE DAYS LEADING UP TO THEIR INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT. IRAQ COULD NOT HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD OUR RESOLVE TO STAND BY OUR FRIENDS IN THE GULF.

- I THINK THAT MOST PEOPLE WILL SEE THIS RUSE FOR WHAT IT IS.

- IRAQ IS OBVIOUSLY ATTEMPTING TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM ITS NAKED AGGRESSION AGAINST KUWAIT.

Is it accurate?

- WE GAVE A READOUT OF THE MEETING ON JULY 26.

- WE'RE NOT INTERESTED IN STARTING A MINOR SIDE DISPUTE OVER ONE PARTICULAR MEETING.

- WE STAND BY OUR ACCOUNT.

- THE PROBLEM HERE IS IRAQ'S INVASION.

Thursday, 7/26/80

Q While you're on Ethiopia, the meeting today between Deputy Secretary Eagleburger and the Ethiopian Foreign Minister -- is this the highest level meeting between the two governments in recent years? Do you know?

17

A I'll have to check on that.

Q Richard, on another subject, can you tell us about the discussions that the Ambassador in Baghdad has had with the Iraqi government?

A Yes. President Husayn met with Ambassador Glaspie yesterday. During the meeting, President Husayn stated his desire for peaceful resolution of the Gulf situation and informed the Ambassador of his plans for discussions with Kuwait.

Ambassador Glaspie took the opportunity to reaffirm the United States' commitment to peace and stability in the Gulf region, and to urge that all sides seek to settle their disputes by peaceful means. The Ambassador also noted that Iraq's decision to hold a dialogue with Kuwait was a step in the right direction.

Q Did the United States ask him to demobilize those troops along the border?

A I don't have that deep a readout for you. Certainly, reduction in tensions of that sort would be something that we welcome.

Q It now seems that Iraq, even though it's saying it, has no intention of going to war. It has at least achieved its objective of getting higher oil prices, or at least it seems that way.

What's the U.S. analysis of this? Are you worried that Iraq, proven successful once, may use this tactic again?

A I don't really have an analysis of that because I'm not sure that your version of events is exactly right. As far as we see it, we see that there appears to be some movement towards a diplomatic dialogue which would diffuse the tensions in the Persian Gulf. We're happy to note that. We note as well that President Mubarak has stated that Iraq and Kuwait have agreed to hold talks this week in Saudi Arabia. That's a positive step. We urge the parties to work out their differences in a peaceful and constructive manner.

Q Right. But the other piece of that is what's going on in Geneva with the OPEC Ministers.

A That's right.

900725 8-27-90 09:18 Glaspie

REGULAR BRIEFING

BRIEFER: RICHARD BOUCHER
12:37 PM (LDT)

WEDNESDAY, JULY 25, 1990

900725 8-27-90 09:18 Glaspie

Q Can you give us a readout, please, on Ambassador Glaspie's meeting with Saddam Husayn today?

MR. BOUCHER: I can't. We don't have a readout yet. She did meet with Saddam Husayn today, but I don't have a readout.

Q How long was the meeting?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know, Ralph. I really don't have any kind of readout.

Q You never got any characterization of the meeting, although many of us did from our bureaus and from wire reports?

MR. BOUCHER: We need to get such characterizations and readouts from our embassy. We've at this point only been able to confirm with them that the meeting took place. I don't have any further information on the meeting.

Q Will you have something later today?

MR. BOUCHER: I'll see if I can get something for you.

300726 8-27-90 09:19 Glaspie

BRIEFER: RICHARD BOUCHER
12:50 PM EDT

THURSDAY, JULY 26, 1990

300726 8-27-90 09:19 Glaspie

Q Richard, on another subject. Can you tell us about the discussions that the Ambassador in Baghdad has had with the Iraqi government?

MR. BOUCHER: Yeah. President Husayn met with Ambassador Glaspie yesterday. During the meeting, President Husayn stated his desire for a peaceful resolution of the Gulf situation, and informed the Ambassador of his plans for discussions with Kuwait. Ambassador Glaspie took the opportunity to reaffirm the United States commitment to peace and stability in the Gulf region, and to urge that all sides seek to settle their disputes by peaceful means. The Ambassador also noted that Iraq's decision to hold a dialogue with Kuwait was a step in the right direction.

Q Did the United States ask him to demobilize those troops along the border?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't have that deep a readout for you. Certainly, a reduction in tensions of that sort would be something that we would welcome.

00802 8-27-90 09:22 Glaspie

20

- Thursday, August 2, 1990
State Department Daily Briefing

00802 8-27-90 09:22 Glaspie

Q Richard, the Kuwaiti ambassador said that he had been -- he had been reassured by the United States as recently as after the meeting between Ambassador Glaspie and Saddam Husayn that the Iraqis have no hostile intentions toward Kuwait. Do you feel that you misread the situation and misled them in some way?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not familiar with his remarks, so I'd really hesitate to comment on that. I think the President talked this morning about the intelligence that he'd had and the concerns that he's had and how those have been reflected to him.

Q But was it your understanding that Saddam would not -- was just saber-rattling and did not intend to use force?

MR. BOUCHER: I never said that. We never said that officially, from here or anywhere else.

Q Where is Ambassador Glaspie right now?

MR. BOUCHER: That's something else that I think I'll have to check on.

00913 9-17-90 09:01 Glaspie

- Thursday, September 13, 1990

21

00913 9-17-90 09:01 Glaspie

Q Richard, speaking of documents, have you seen this mysterious Iraqi document purporting to be a report of a conversation between Ambassador Glaspie and Saddam Hussein some time ago?

MR. BOUCHER: I haven't seen a whole document, I've seen several different press reports about it. And let me just say that our position on threats and intimidation that was being carried out by Iraq at the time against its neighbors was clear in the days leading up to the invasion and Iraq's occupation of Kuwait.

Iraq could not have misunderstood our resolve to stand by our friends in the Gulf. We think that most people will see this ruse for what it is, and that's an attempt by Iraq to divert attention from its naked aggression in Kuwait, and that remains the issue here.

Q So, you're saying that document is false?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not going to get into comparing documents and comparing texts of individual meetings. We gave a readout of the meeting in our briefing on July 26th. We stand by that account. We're not setting up -- we're not interested in setting up some side dispute over the authenticity of somebody's version of a particular meeting. The issue here is not any side dispute like that, the issue is that Iraq has moved into Kuwait --

Q But one of the --

MR. BOUCHER: -- against what I think were clear -- clear international obligations and norms.

Q But there's something that's purporting to be a transcript. Are you saying they're lying? Have they invented that transcript? Is that an inaccurate account of that meeting?

MR. BOUCHER: We're frankly not interested in debating it.

Q But it's not a debate; it's a question.

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-HORE-

MR. BOUCHER: Well, it's not something that we have done in the past in terms of trying to confirm the accuracy of transcripts or documents that might have been leaked or put out by somebody else. We see it as totally a side issue of exactly what happened in one particular meeting, and we are not interested in getting into some sort of question of whose transcript of the meeting is more accurate, who took better notes.

The fact of the matter is that Iraq, against international opinion, against clear statements by us and many others that the disputes should be solved peacefully, and against clear international law and obligations, has moved into Kuwait. And we are not interested in anything that would draw attention away from that fact or let the Iraqis divert attention.

00913 9-17-90 09:01 Glaspie

Q Richard, on the question again of Glaspie, at the time of the invasion, several other ambassadors from other countries were out of Iraq and they have gone back in without it being interpreted as in any way sanctioning or abiding by the events since. Are there any plans to send her back in, change her status, do anything with her dog, any of that stuff? (Laughter.)

MR. BOUCHER: (Laughing) -- I haven't checked on the dog. No, there's been -- there has been no change in plans. She's still with us, she's still working with us, consulting with us. She has participated in various meetings. I reported yesterday about how she'd gone to Brussels, the fact that she's been in several other meetings with the President.

Q Why are there no plans to send her back? What --

MR. BOUCHER: It's just a decision that has not been made to -- mean, nobody thought it was a good idea to do at this time.

00917 9-20-90 16:22 Glaspie

- Monday, September 17, 1990
State Department Daily Briefing

22

00917 9-20-90 16:22 Glaspie

Q I remember the night before the invasion, the Secretary -- the day before the invasion, the Secretary had a meeting in Irkutsk with Minister Shevardnadze, and they discussed this issue. And according to the Secretary's account of that the next day on the plane, Shevardnadze didn't -- said he didn't think there would be an invasion, but Mr. Baker said that the United States was very worried about the buildup of the forces and that they weren't quite as relaxed as that. And that was the same day that Ambassador -- what's her name --?

Q Glaspie.

Q Glaspie -- Ambassador Glaspie left Iraq. How would you account for this discrepancy of evaluations?

MR. BOUCHER: What discrepancy of evaluations? I haven't --

Q The fact that Secretary Baker --

MR. BOUCHER: We gave a readout on the meeting that April Glaspie had on -- we gave the readout on July 26th. I think that record is very clear and is very interesting. Shevardnadze made several comments when we were in -- when they were in Moscow, and issued the statement, which came after the invasion.

Q But the Secretary --

MR. BOUCHER: And I think that is -- that is consistent with what I'm saying here, that there was no indication from our part that we were somehow complacent or accepting of a potential Iraqi invasion.

Q The discrepancy I'm referring to is the fact that Secretary Baker thought there might be an invasion, and at the same time, Ambassador Glaspie felt relaxed enough to leave Baghdad and subsequently told the New York Times last week no one expected an invasion. That's the discrepancy I'm referring to.

MR. BOUCHER: Well, I don't -- I don't want to get into comparing notes on different meetings. I don't see any problem with the way we interpreted things at the time, with the way we expressed ourselves at the time, the points we made at the time, and I think certainly the Secretary's remarks at the time and over the weekend bear out what I'm saying.

900921 9-24-90 08:19 Glaspie

- Friday, September 21, 1990

23

900921 9-24-90 08:19 Glaspie

CONTINUED ON Q -- I just want to know if the administration and the State Department has seen the text, and if there is anything in that text that quoted her that is being contested by the administration as inaccurate.

MS. TUTWILER: To my knowledge, I do not believe that we have seen the Iraqi text of a conversation. And as you know, it is our standard rules, we do not make public or put on the record diplomatic cables back and forth with our own people.

And so I don't have anything further to advance your story than what Assistant Secretary Kelly testified to this week in extensive testimony for three and a half hours. He was asked this question a number of times there; or what the NZ President or Secretary Baker has said.

Q Just to follow up on the press reports that the Ambassador did not warn Saddam Hussein, and that she said that there were -- that it was not American interests -- that the United States did not have interests in the intra-Arab disputes, is that -- is that accurate? Is that what she told him?

MS. TUTWILER: I'd really like to play ball with you here, Cliff, and help you advance your story. But I'm just really not in the position to do it, and as I had said earlier to Jim this week, I really don't think it serves any useful purpose.

We have, as an administration, on the record, any of number people answered all those questions concerning Ambassador Kelly and Ambassador Glaspie, and I am just going to refrain from carrying the ball forward.

- MORE -

24

Q Margaret --

Q Just one more on this.

Q Okay. Q You referred, Cliff, to statements of Ambassador Glaspie's in the meeting, but some of the controversy is over what Saddam Hussein is said to have said at the meeting, and whether -- why Ambassador Glaspie didn't react to his apparent threat to invade Kuwait, if there -- if the talks did not resolve themselves pretty quickly.

Can you help us at all on what Saddam Hussein said to the United States in that meeting? There are no less than three major newspaper columnists today making the assumption in their columns that he warned. basically, he would invade, and that the US Ambassador did not react.

MS. TUTWILER: Well, I do not go into -- I'll be happy to take your question, since it's coming in a little different form. If we -- I'm sure the answer, as I'm sure you're sure, is going to come up a negative -- if
wnt to engage in what Saddam Hussein may or may not have said in a particular meeting. I'll be happy to ask.

901010 10-11-90 15:46 Glaspie

- Wednesday, October 10, 1990

25

901010 10-11-90 15:46 Glaspie

Q Margaret, I keep wondering, is it unusual for the United States to be releasing this negotiated letter between Levy and Baker? And is there a difference in status between this letter, diplomatically speaking, and, for instance, the cable from Ambassador Glaspie about her meeting with Saddam Hussein that's caused so much controversy, which the State Department has said it won't release because it's a diplomatic cable. Is there some difference in status here?

MS. TUTWILER: This is not in cable form, this is actually a letter. And so that is an obvious difference right off the top.

910213 2-19-91 14:48 Glaspie

~ Wednesday, February 13, 1991

26

910213 2-19-91 14:48 Glaspie

Q Margaret, a House Foreign Affairs committee --
subcommittee wants April Glaspie and Assistant Secretary Kelly
to come and testify and they're complaining that the State
Department is basically stiffing them on that. Do you know
anything --

MS. TUTWILER: I don't know, Allan (sp). I know that many
committees of the House and Senate ask for State Department
officials all the time. I'll just have to check with Janet, I
don't know.

- Thursday, February 14, 1991

27

Q Margaret, yesterday you were asked to take a question about whether the Department was blocking Ambassador Glaspie's testimony before the Hill.

MS. TUTWILER: Mmm-hmm?

Q And when the reply was posted, it -- the question was rewritten to eliminate her name, and thus missed the point. Could you take the question again?

MS. TUTWILER: I'll take the question again. I'm sure that the Congressional Affairs office is going to respond in the same way. I told you yesterday, there are any number of committees that are requesting any number of officials, not only in the Middle Eastern Bureau here at the State Department, but all bureaus. And just because somebody requests, as you know, all the time, we work on schedules and we work it out so that we can work between the two branches of government.

And their point yesterday, as the President makes continuously, as to show how cooperative we have been as an administration with the Congress. Even many members of Congress have said what extraordinary lengths we have gone to to keep them fully briefed, to have very senior members of this administration up there briefing them on a regular, fairly routine basis, and so that was our point back to you, and I will just have to say as a general category, there are any number of requests for any number of officials to come and testify before committees, subcommittees, et cetera.

MORE-

MS. TUTWILER: She had been asked, as all ambassadors in this region have been asked. This is not, in our opinion, and you may absolutely have every valid right to disagree with it, not the time to be doing TV interviews and magazine interviews and newspaper interviews, and I think you will find, correct me if I'm wrong, that that policy has been uniform for this region for all of our ambassadors.

Q Your earlier answer suggested that it was a matter of people being too busy. I just -- that --

MS. TUTWILER: That is what our view is of it, and I'm not aware that she disagrees with that. And that is our view is that these people are understandably very, very busy in their region of the world where there is obviously a very major situation, for lack of better characterization.

Q Doesn't congressional courtesy usually call for making available any official who was confirmed by Congress?

MS. TUTWILER: Yes, and I don't believe that I've said or our guidance -- our response last night said that we are not going to do so.

Q (Off mike) -- Ambassador Glaspie under wraps?

MS. TUTWILER: Secretary Baker answered that. She is not anymore under wraps than any other ambassador in this region. The question comes specifically at request from you all for interviews with her and other ambassadors -- Ambassador Wilson, Ambassador Howell, Ambassador Harrison, Ambassador Freeman. I mean, I could name any ambassadors in this region, and our response has consistently been that our view is -- is that all these people are very, very busy. I think everyone understands that they are busy, and that they simply have not had time to take it out of their schedules to go do on-camera interviews for you and on-the-record interviews. My understanding that many of you -- many of you in this room have talked to these individuals, but you've been talking to them on background.

Q Margaret, what work have Miss -- Ambassador Glaspie did utter a few words in response to a --

MS. TUTWILER: Stakeout at her own home.

Q -- CBS stakeout of her house, and her response wasn't quite the same. It didn't indicate that she was too busy to talk. I don't have the words in front of me, but my recollection of it was that it was that she had been asked not to discuss the subject.

961018A

10-19-90

15:15 Glaspi

HEARING OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: PERSIAN GULF SITUATION

CHAired BY: REPRESENTATIVE DANTE FASCELL (D-FL)

WITNESS:

SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER, III

3901018A

10-19-90

15:15 Glaspi

REP. SOLARZ: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, since the inception of this crisis, I think it's fair to say that you and your associates in the administration have handled the challenge posed by Iraq magnificently. But I also have to say that prior to the inception of this crisis, you and your associates in the administration handled the potential challenge of Saddam Hussein miserably.

In effect, I think you made the same mistake that Dean Acheson and Douglas MacArthur made 40 years when they read South Korea outside of the American defense perimeter in Asia, thereby inviting Kim Il Sung to go to war against the South.

When Ambassador Glaspi, presumably acting under your instructions, told Saddam Hussein that the United States takes no position on these intra-Arab disputes, such as your border dispute with Kuwait; when Assistant Secretary Kelly (sp), presumably acting under your instructions, told our Committee that we have no defense commitment to Kuwait, we, in effect, invited Saddam Hussein to take matters into his own hands.

Having said that, I'd like to begin my questioning by observing that during the war in Vietnam an American officer once said that, "We had to destroy the village in order to save it." Is it the position of the administration now that we have to wait for Kuwait to be destroyed before we save it, or are we prepared to move before that time should come?

SEC. BAKER: Move in which way, Mr. Solarz? Militarily?

REP. SOLARZ: If that should be necessary.

SEC. BAKER: Well, I would be happy to visit with you after this session and tell you exactly where we are, with those plans. I don't want to do that here now, for obvious reasons.

00915 2-22-91 14:24 Glaspie

PRESS BRIEFING BY
THE HONORABLE JAMES A. BAKER, III
FOLLOWING MEETINGS WITH CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL
AND FOREIGN MINISTER HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER

COLOGNE/BONN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
BONN, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
SEPTEMBER 15, 1990

00915 2-22-91 14:24 Glaspie

QUESTION: Back in Washington, our Ambassador to Baghdad, April Glaspie, has come under a lot of criticism lately for a cable and conversation she had with Saddam Husayn a week before the invasion which -- some have argued, at least -- gave the impression inadvertently that the United States would not stand in the way of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. I'm sure you've seen the reports and I wonder if you could react to that.

SECRETARY BAKER: My reaction is the same as the White House reaction. I think the suggestion is ludicrous. I think that Ambassador Glaspie is a dedicated public servant who has done a fine job for her country and I think it's, as I say, ludicrous to somehow suggest that the United States contributed to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

QUESTION: Are you saying that the reports are incorrect that April Glaspie did not say to Saddam Husayn -- did not give him the impression that we regarded this as an inter-Arab matter and did not use the language that was reported? Are you saying she did but she wasn't operating under your orders, or are you saying she did but there was no fault in that?

SECRETARY BAKER: I'm saying that somehow the suggestion that the United States contributed directly or indirectly to Iraq's aggression against Kuwait is a ludicrous suggestion. And I am not commenting on the substance of diplomatic correspondence.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Assistance Secretary/Spokesman

30

For Immediate Release
PR NO. 143

September 24, 1990

INTERVIEW OF
THE HONORABLE JAMES A. BAKER, III
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON
NBC-TV "MEET THE PRESS"
WASHINGTON, D.C.
SEPTEMBER 23, 1990

MR. GARRICK UTLEY: There is an uneasy feeling of where the conflict in the Persian Gulf is headed. Each week that passes without serious incident should build confidence that we will not end up in war, but that is not exactly what's happening. Neither side wants war, but each side continues to prepare for it. And since each side appears to be intractable in its demands, there appears to be little role for diplomacy and no talk of compromise.

That's why we're talking to Secretary of State James Baker this morning, and joining me here are R. W. Applo of The New York Times and John Dancy, Chief Diplomatic Correspondent of NBC News.

Good morning, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY BAKER: Good morning, Garrick.

MR. UTLEY: Thanks for being here. You heard the news from Baghdad today. Saddam Husayn has issued another statement. He's warned that if Iraq is strangled by the U.S.-led embargo pressure against him, he will attack oil fields; he will bring Israel into the war.

Now, given that, given our position, is there any role left for diplomacy, which is your job?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I think there is, and we're going to be having meetings up at the United Nations this coming week, looking toward -- in fact, we're going to have a meeting of Foreign Ministers -- the Security Council is going to meet at the Foreign Minister level -- something that hasn't happened in quite some time -- looking at possible next steps.

MR. UTLEY: O.K. That's diplomacy in terms of the countries aligned against Iraq, but one of the things that's under discussion there is to extend the embargo to include an air embargo. So we're tightening the screws even more.

SECRETARY BAKER: That's one of the things that's under discussion. That's right.

MR. UTLEY: So in terms of diplomacy with Iraq, in terms of any negotiations, any possible compromise, is there any role for diplomacy there?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, compromise from what? If you're talking about compromising the basic U.N. resolutions, I think the answer must be no, and the world community -- not just the United States -- has made that very clear.

We can't begin to walk away from six unanimous Security Council resolutions which would in effect -- a walking away which might in effect reward Saddam Husayn's unprovoked aggression. That's simply not going to happen -- not just because the United States says it isn't going to happen, but because the world community says it must not happen.

It has happened before in world history. We remember the circumstances of the '30s, and it would be a serious mistake to start walking down that road.

MR. JOHN DANCY: Let me just follow up on that for a second, if I might, Mr. Secretary. What happens, though, if Saddam Husayn pulls out? Are there matters which we would be willing to negotiate with Saddam?

SECRETARY BAKER: It's not a case of our negotiating things, John. It's a case, I think, if there is complete, unconditional withdrawal and a restoration of the legitimate Government of Kuwait, then you might see some discussions between Kuwait and Iraq of the differences that led to the unprovoked aggression in the first instance.

MR. DANCY: Mr. Secretary, one of the threats that Saddam made this morning was to play the Israeli card. He has his missiles over in the western part of the country where they could reach Israel. How serious is the fear that he would play this card in hopes of uniting the Arab countries once again behind him in a battle against Israel?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, you know, one more case of unprovoked aggression; I don't think, is going to lead to uniting the Arab countries, the majority of which are strongly united in support of the United Nations and the world community.

MR. DANCY: But if you had Israel involved in this, would the Arab countries remain united in their opposition to Saddam Husayn?

SECRETARY BAKER: I think it might depend entirely on the way in which that involvement took place, but, if it takes place as a consequence of further unprovoked aggression by Saddam Husayn, I don't see that happening.

MR. R. W. APPLE: Mr. Secretary, shortly before this invasion, the United States Ambassador in Baghdad, April Glaspie, acting, she said, on direct instructions from you, went to see -- acting in what she said, not going to see him because of what you said -- went to see Saddam Husayn. After he'd delivered a diatribe, she made it quite clear in quite explicit language -- as I said, authorized by you -- that the United States took no position as between Kuwait and Iraq in this border dispute, an economic dispute, they were then having.

Why was she told to say that?

SECRETARY BAKER: Johnny, I think what you see here has best been characterized, if I might say so, by a very good article that Ed Yoder wrote yesterday that was published in The Washington Post, and what he called all of this was "retrospective scapegoating," and he characterized it as shameful.

Frankly, it doesn't surprise you that I would agree with that. But let me tell you what the signals were that were sent to Saddam Husayn before this happened.

Signal No. 1 was to slap foreign policy export control on exports to Iraq.

Signal No. 2 was to cancel or suspend the Commodity Credit Corporation program with Iraq.

Signal No. 3 was to prohibit the export of a number of items that we and some of our allies thought might be useful in terms of missile or nuclear proliferation.

MR. APPLE: But is it not --

SECRETARY BAKER: ~~So you want to get some 20/20 hindsight~~ going ~~on the basis of~~ highly critical, frankly, of some very ~~fine~~ ~~servants of the United States.~~

MR. APPLE: No. Nobody's trying to criticize --

SECRETARY BAKER: They are -- a lot --

MR. APPLE: --- April Glaspie. They're trying to criticize you.

SECRETARY BAKER: A lot of people are trying to criticize --

MR. APPLE: Well, I'm not.

SECRETARY BAKER: -- Ambassador Kelly -- no. What you want me to do is --

MR. APPLE: I want you to tell me --

SECRETARY BAKER: What you want me to do is to say that those instructions were sent specifically by me on my specific orders. I'm not going to deny, Johnny, what the policy was, but I'm going to say to you that there are probably 312,000 or so cables that go out under my name as Secretary of State --

MR. APPLE: Why was --

SECRETARY BAKER: -- from the Department of State.

MR. APPLE: Why was the policy, as Ms. Glaspie said, as Mr. Kelly said on Capitol Hill, not to take any sides between the Kuwaitis, whom we thought to be completely pacific, and Saddam Husayn, whom we knew to be an extreme dictator?

SECRETARY BAKER: That had to do with taking sides on a border dispute -- not taking sides on the question of unprovoked aggression. But some have translated it to mean taking sides with respect to unprovoked aggression.

MR. APPLE: Well, why was it our policy not to take a position on the border dispute? Did we think that one was as right as the other?

SECRETARY BAKER: There are border disputes going on all over the world, Johnny, and we take positions on some, and we don't take positions on others. -- But let me say one more thing: The suggestion that somehow the United States contributed to Saddam Husayn's unprovoked aggression against this small country is ludicrous, absolutely ludicrous.

MR. UTLEY: Mr. Secretary, coming back to events today, you pick up a newspaper in Washington this morning. You see a front-page story about contingency plans for the Army and the Marines in case of war to mount attack through Jordanian territory, coming down from Turkey as well as in Saudi Arabia against Iraq.

Are the Jordanian and the Turkish governments aware of these plans or thinking that's going on?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I don't want to speak to the allegations that are contained in there, Garrick, because that gets into discussions of what may or may not be operational details, and I don't want to do that. So I don't want to be in the attitude here of either confirming or denying that story.

MR. UTLEY: All right. But Americans see these stories. Last Sunday the story about how we would bomb Baghdad. Air Force power would prevail in such a war. People are concerned about war. Are you confident, is the President confident, that there will not be a war with Iraq?

SECRETARY BAKER: We have said many times that we hope there won't be. The President has been very outspoken in saying that the way to resolve -- he hopes that this matter will be resolved peacefully, politically and through diplomatic means. That would be his preference by far. But he will not and indeed should not rule out other options.

So the other option has to be there, and, therefore, you're going to see speculative pieces from time to time like this. But I'm not going to get into commenting on what might or might not be operational details of a potential military operation.

MR. UTLEY: The exiled Emir of Kuwait is coming to Washington. He's going to meet with the President this coming week. How comfortable are you defending a regime which is by no means democratic, and a lot of people have raised that question? It's not in our tradition.

SECRETARY BAKER: Sure. We have a strong preference for democracy. We are strongly committed to democracy. We are seeing what that commitment has been able to produce, I think, in Eastern and Central Europe after 40 or 45 years.

But the one thing we have to be very careful about here is getting into the position of saying that because the particular form of government that was overthrown by force and by this unprovoked aggression was not a form of government that we prefer, therefore, we must somehow change that or participate in changing that form of government. That would be nothing more than reward Saddam Husayn for his aggression.

MR. UTLEY: O.K. But if Saddam says, "I'll get out of Kuwait." If there are elections or a referendum held under U.N. or Arab League control on whether the Emir return, would that be interesting?

SECRETARY BAKER: Out of Kuwait, restore the legitimate government, so that his unprovoked aggression does not pay. Then there can be discussions between Kuwait and Iraq about some of these detailed problems.

MR. UTLEY: Might we encourage the Emir of Kuwait to support such a referendum perhaps or free elections?

SECRETARY BAKER: I think if you do that, you're starting down a very slippery slope of rewarding someone for their aggression and then you really will see suggestions of appeasement, and all that kind of thing, and that would be wrong.

MR. RANCY: Mr. Secretary, The New York Times today has a long rehash of the events that led up to Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, and it quotes an unnamed State Department official as saying that, "We would probably would not have resisted, had Iraq not taken all of Kuwait; had it moved part way into Kuwait."

Now, granted that this is a blind quote from an unnamed official, what's your reaction to that?

SECRETARY BAKER: If I spent my time responding to blind quotes from unnamed officials, John, I wouldn't get anything else done in this job. You can get all the blind quotes you want, and there are about 7,000 officials in that building, or 6,000. So I --

MR. DANCY: Do I take that as a denial?

SECRETARY BAKER: Of course, you take it as a denial. But the point is it's not productive to respond to quotes from -- blind quotes from unnamed officials.

MR. APPLE: Mr. Secretary, it's not true that you can get any quote you want from a State Department official -- (laughter) --

SECRETARY BAKER: You can get almost any quote, though, Johnny, and you know it very well.

MR. APPLE: Let me try -- let me tempt you to describe my line of questioning once more as ludicrous. I enjoy that. You talk about hindsight. You have hindsight too. You're capable of looking back and saying, "I should or shouldn't have done that."

Do you now think that it was a mistake for us not to say to Saddam point blank, "You go across that border, and you'll have a hell of a response on your hands."

SECRETARY BAKER: I'm not going to speculate on hypotheticals with you, Johnny, because, first of all, we have not and will not confirm the contents of diplomatic communications. So it's not -- again, it's not something -- it's not a game that I'm going to play.

The President has said in hindsight, maybe there were some things we should have done differently. I agree with that, of course. But to play this game of, "Well, should you have said this or that or the other," it's interesting to me that the actions I've just outlined for you that we took in advance of the invasion are not mentioned in articles that look at the events that took place just before the [invasion]. Why aren't they mentioned?

MR. UTLEY: Mr. Secretary, we'll get into a number of other questions about the Persian Gulf, other matters of foreign policy, as we continue here on "Meet the Press." We'll be right back.

(Commercial pause)

MR. UTLEY: This morning, R. W. Apple, John Dancy and I are talking with Secretary of State James Baker about the conflict in the Persian Gulf.

The other day, Mr. Secretary, the President voiced his concern, his worry about possible terrorist attacks against American targets. Saddam said he was not surprised if -- or would not be surprised if some Arabs lashed out.

If that happens, is that not an act of war which would bring the appropriate response?

SECRETARY BAKER: The President has made it very clear that he thinks one of his highest duties as President of the United States is to protect American citizens; and, therefore, I think that if something like that happened, there would in all probability be an appropriate response. I think he's made that very clear.

MR. UTLEY: Well, would it be an act of war, a terrorist attack, under these circumstances?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, it depends on the nature and extent of it, Garrick. We would not have much latitude.

MR. UTLEY: And would an appropriate response possibly include military action of some sort?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, he hasn't ruled it in; he hasn't ruled it out. I'm not going to rule it in or out on this program. Certainly, it might.

MR. UTLEY: John?

MR. DANCY: Mr. Secretary, earlier -- it's been such a short time frame, I can't remember the exact time -- but within the past week or so the United States floated the idea of a \$21 billion arms package for the Saudis.

Where do we stand on that now? Have you backed off that?

SECRETARY BAKER: No. The President has not backed off that. The package, however, will be phased. We've had some extensive consultations with the Congress as we committed to them at the beginning of this Administration that we would in connection with arms sales. The package will be presented to the Hill in two phases.

One phase will be presented very shortly, perhaps early next week, and we would expect to see action on that immediately. It would represent the needs that we think are immediate for Saudi Arabia, and frankly needs that will serve to protect American lives.

MR. DANCY: How quickly do you get to the second phase of that, and what's the total overall figure for the package?

SECRETARY BAKER: I don't want to quantify it. I don't want to put a percentage on it, but provocation would call, I think, for some sort of an appropriate response, and that might be a response that is designed to protect American citizens that might be different than a response designed for full implementation of all of the U.N. Security Council resolutions.

MR. UTLEY: Mr. Secretary, sometimes it's hard to believe that there are other things happening in the world outside the Gulf. It's amazing that we can be sitting here a week before German unification and not really having that as a top issue.

But to take South Africa, for example. President de Klerk has arrived. He's meeting with the President. He wants a change in our policy. Is anything going to happen there? Will we ease our sanctions?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I just met President de Klerk at the Reflecting Pool. He was asked a question during the course of a photo opportunity there, and he said, "I don't come with a shopping list." I think it's interesting to note, though, that negotiations have begun between the government and the black majority -- at least talks about talks have. That's very encouraging.

I know that President de Klerk wants to see those continue. He, himself, has said that South-Africa is on an irreversible course toward abolition of apartheid, leading to a non-racial democracy or leading to a democratic form of government. And I think that is very, very positive, and I think we here in the United States should be encouraging those negotiations in every way that we can, and encouraging both sides to continue those negotiations.

MR. DANCY: Mr. Secretary, you're going this week up to the U.N. Security Council, and you'll be there for most of the week. But you'll be at a U.N. Security Council session which will be unusual, in that it will be chaired by most of the Foreign Ministers of the Security Council.

Will the Security Council then pass a resolution calling for an air embargo?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, in announcing the fact that we would have a ministerial level meeting of the Security Council, we said that there would be action taken on resolutions if it were appropriate. So let's get up there and see the degree to which it might be appropriate at the time.

MR. DANCY: All right. You're now down to air embargo and sanctions against countries which violate the embargo. Are you now running out of non-military options?

SECRETARY BAKER: I think there are a lot of other things, John, that could be thought about, considered and perhaps done.

MR. DANCY: For example?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I ought not to lay them out here on the program, but the answer to your question is, no, I don't think we're running out of non-military type sanctions. I think there are a whole host of other things that might be considered.

MR. APPLE: As Garrick suggests, we really shouldn't leave -- we have a minute left -- without talking about Germany. Let me ask you this: Germany has not played as large a role in the Persian Gulf as it might have. Chancellor Kohl has said the constitution and the country's past history is one reason. Do you look for Germany five years down the road from this momentous change to play a full role in the world?

SECRETARY BAKER: Yes. I think that being more -- and Germany is now more by virtue of unification -- being more means doing more. And I think the German government itself believes that and feels that, and that's what Chancellor Kohl said during the course of our meeting with him last week when he, by the way, pledged \$2 billion just between now and the end of the year to support this effort in the Persian Gulf, and talked about amending their constitution to permit Germany to play a greater role in the future.

MR. GARRICK UTLEY: Mr. Secretary, a busy week you have coming ahead in New York and elsewhere. Thank you very much for being with us this morning.

SECRETARY BAKER: Thank you, Garrick.

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INTERVIEW OF
THE HONORABLE JAMES A. BAKER, III
SECRETARY OF STATE

BY
CONNIE CHUNG ON CBS-TV

31

Washington, D.C.
February 11, 1991

CONNIE CHUNG: A year ago Saddam Husayn was the brutal dictator of Iraq, just like he is today. Only a year ago, he was our dictator, an uneasy and distasteful ally of America. We sold him food and farm equipment and weapons.

With the eight-year war with Iran, we took sides, his side. But on August 2, when his army rolled into Kuwait, we decided he wasn't our friend anymore. Could the U.S. have stopped Saddam Husayn from invading Kuwait in the first place?

Our Ambassador to Iraq met with Saddam Husayn just one week before the invasion. What did she tell him? She's become somewhat of a mystery woman, not seen or heard.

Tonight, in his first in-depth interview since the war began, Secretary of State James Baker takes an unusual, personal look inside the roots of war.

James Addison Baker, III, has been at George Bush's side for 30 years.

SECRETARY BAKER: Sorry I'm running late. I apologize.

MS. CHUNG: No, no. That's quite all right.

And as America slipped towards war, he was guiding his best friend's foreign policy.

When did you realize that the U.S. was going to war?

SECRETARY BAKER: It was pretty clear in the aftermath of that meeting in Geneva. We had to at least harbor the thought that there might be some flexibility demonstrated in that meeting. We were not optimistic.

MS. CHUNG: James Baker had come to Geneva on January 9 to meet with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. America's top diplomat had a letter with him, a letter addressed to Saddam Husayn, containing the President's final and firmest warning.

SECRETARY BAKER: We left that letter in the middle of the table for the full six and a half hours. He just put it back there. As we took our breaks -- we took two breaks -- I instructed our security people to make sure that the letter was not removed, that it stayed there, and it did stay there. And at the very end of the meeting, I said, "Now, do I understand that you are not going to accept this letter?" And he said, "That's correct. I am not going to accept it."

MS. CHUNG: So when you left that meeting with Tariq Aziz, that was the moment that you believed the U.S. was going to war?

SECRETARY BAKER: I did not think, coming out of that meeting, that war was absolutely inevitable, but it certainly appeared to me, as well, I'm sure, as to others, that we were -- that it looked like we were pretty much on that course because of the absence of flexibility. Up until that --

MS. CHUNG: There wasn't any flexibility from your side either, though, was there?

SECRETARY BAKER: There was no flexibility as far as negotiating backwards from solemn U.N. resolutions.

MS. CHUNG: Had you hoped to go on to Baghdad after Geneva?

SECRETARY BAKER: No. The President had made it very clear by then that we had offered 15 days, during which we would be -- any one of which, including Christmas and New Year's, we would have been willing for me to go to Baghdad. That we were --

MS. CHUNG: I know that the President said he was not going to have you go to Baghdad. But did you want to go to Baghdad?

SECRETARY BAKER: No, because I did not want to be a party to Iraq's playing around with the deadline.

MS. CHUNG: But looking back now, because time has passed by, would you have wanted that opportunity to meet with Saddam Husayn? That you, Jim Baker, who has had great successes diplomatically, could have done something in a face to face meeting?

SECRETARY BAKER: I don't think that it would have -- I don't think it would have made any difference.

MS. CHUNG: I'm just wondering -- personally. You're flying back -- you're flying back West again after the Tariq Aziz meeting. A little sinking feeling in your heart?

SECRETARY BAKER: Disappointed that there was no Iraqi flexibility, because we would have much preferred a peaceful solution. That was not --

MS. CHUNG: But does Jim Baker ever say --

SECRETARY BAKER: That was not to be. Sure, that's one -- that's why -- when I say disappointment, that's what I mean, disappointed.

MS. CHUNG: Do you feel any sense of personal defeat because diplomacy failed?

SECRETARY BAKER: I don't see this as a failure of diplomacy. I see what has been accomplished since the 2nd of August really as a victory for diplomacy. When you look at the unprecedented coalition that has been pulled together, and when you look at the degree to which it has remained unified over the course of almost three weeks now of war -- unified politically, economically and militarily -- I think pulling all that together and maintaining that coalition is really a victory for diplomacy.

MS. CHUNG: It's easy to get a clear picture of what diplomatic steps were taken after the invasion. But what signals was the U.S. sending before the invasion of Kuwait? What intelligence was James Baker's State Department receiving? And what was he telling his Ambassador in the region to convey to Saddam Husayn?

Did you have any idea that Iraq would invade Kuwait?

SECRETARY BAKER: We began to get nervous about it the last few days of July -- maybe July 25th on -- when we saw evidence of troop movements. I was in Irkutsk, as a matter of fact, with the Soviet Union's Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. And I said something to him on the 31st of July or the 1st of August, and he said, oh, no, no, no, that could never happen. We're not going to -- and later on, when he joined me in that statement on the 3rd of August in Moscow, where the Soviet Union stood up and supported -- stood shoulder to shoulder with the United States, he said publicly that he did not believe us when we said we were worried about Iraq invading Kuwait.

MS. CHUNG: ~~What was the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April~~ Glaspie, telling you regarding the troop movements?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, ~~our intelligence was -- beginning, as I say, around the 25th -- 24th or 25th -- began to indicate that there was -- maybe it was 26th or 27th. Don't hold me to the exact date, but the intelligence began to indicate movement:~~

MS. CHUNG: Well, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, met with Saddam Husayn on the 25th.

SECRETARY BAKER: On the 25th -- that's right.

MS. CHUNG: What was she telling you about Saddam Husayn's intentions prior to that meeting?

BAKER: Well, I'd have to go back and look at those because I was in the Pacific, and I would have to see, take a look at each of the reporting cables before I to get into that with you.

This is the meeting between Saddam Husayn and out to Iraq, April Glaspie. It took place just one week invaded Kuwait on August 2nd, on July 25th, right time U.S. intelligence was telling James Baker ayn's army was apparently preparing for war. to the State Department, Ambassador Glaspie was given an hour's notice to attend the meeting.

there be no specific instructions? If you were important information from U.S. intelligence about movements -- and you didn't give her any is on this important meeting that she was having with ayn on July 25th --

BAKER: I'm not sure we were receiving the e before she had that meeting, to be very honest I said we were getting intelligence around the 25th. time frame. So I can't answer that for you.

This, in part, is what she told the Iraqi dictator. o a transcript made public by the Iraqi Embassy, a our State Department has not disputed.

ent," she said, "I have lived here for four years. ir extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. I d funds. We understand that and are of the opinion ould have the opportunity to rebuild your country. hold no opinion about are inter-Arab disputes, such er disagreement with Kuwait."

lly telling him that the United States has no his border dispute with Kuwait and has no opinion.

BAKER: ~~What she's really not~~ -- that's really ~~What I think she's stating was~~ former policy of the United States at that time, ~~that we did not have a security guarantee or a~~ ~~it's arrangement with Kuwait~~

Well, that doesn't make sense, sir. Forgive me, ying that the policy was that the United States n about Saddam Husayn's border dispute with Kuwait.

BAKER: No, what I'm saying is I -- what I --

nd yet you were worried about the troop movements some sort of warnings.

BAKER: ~~What~~ What I'm saying is that I think that think what she's stating there, is the policy, there was no -- that there were no security hat's the way I would interpret that.

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If Saddam Husayn had been sufficiently warned, repeatedly warned in some way or another, by the United States, by the U.S. ~~Ambassador~~ to Iraq, might this have prevented --

SECRETARY BAKER: Maybe. You might be able -- yes, absolutely. And as the President has said, as I have said, with 20-20 hindsight there might be some things we would have done differently, you know, we might very well have with 20-20 hindsight.

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